

**"EUROPEAN SECURITY:
WHAT ARE THE RIGHT QUESTIONS?"**

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL (P) PAUL G. WOLFE

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public
release. Distribution is
unlimited.

"The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government."

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

19960729 074

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 20 MAY 96		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED SSC FELLOW RESEARCH PAPER	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE "EUROPEAN SECURITY: WHAT ARE THE RIGHT QUESTIONS?"				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) WOLFE, PAUL G., LTC(P), USA					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE ROOT HALL, BLDG 122 CARLISLE BARRACKS CARLISLE, PA 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES SUITE 1000, 910 17th STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) Is the security of Europe important to the United States? - Why? What does security mean? What factors affect a nation's security and specifically Europe's security? What has been the impact of the question and dialogue over "NATO enlargement"? Are the right questions and issues being asked and debated? Have policy priorities been established and understood? These questions will be addressed and recommendations for a more secure Europe are offered by this paper.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS				15. NUMBER OF PAGES	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL		

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18
298-102

ENC 4

EUROPEAN SECURITY; WHAT ARE THE RIGHT QUESTIONS?????

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND.

Is the security of Europe important to the United States? - Why? What does security mean? What factors affect a nation's security and specifically Europe's security? What has been the impact of the question and dialogue over "NATO enlargement"? Are the right questions and issues being asked and debated? Have policy priorities been established and understood?

These questions will be addressed and recommendations for a more secure Europe will be offered by this paper.

Historically, European security has been considered in the vital national interest of the United States. Two World Wars have been fought due to an historically, unstable Europe. Today, however, George Kennan, the father of the policy of U.S. containment, which resulted in the demise of the Soviet Union, sees no basis for internal European nor major power conflict in world today. What factors will affect European security in the future? Is European security in the vital national interest of the U.S. today? What about Russia? What course will Russia politically and economically choose? Can there be a truly secure Europe without considering and including Russia in the security equation? The current dialogue in the United States, all too often, considers security as largely a military and defense issue. Many Americans and Europeans have always considered security within a broader context which includes economic, political, social, cultural, educational, and defense/military elements. Certainly an overarching concept of security must be understood and considered if security is to be comprehensively achieved.

Today the entire issue of European security has, in large measure, been centered on and revolved around the question of "NATO enlargement". European security continues to be primarily framed within this single military and defensive context. - Should NATO expand? Which countries should be invited to join the alliance, when and under what conditions? These questions have consumed much of the time and dialogue reference European security. Whether NATO should enlarge or not is the wrong question and issue. The central question is "What economic, political, social, cultural, educational and defensive measures enhance or detract from European security?". Framed within this wider context comprehensive security can be understood, addressed, and the interrelationships of these complex factors considered.

II. THE IMPORTANCE OF EUROPE TO THE UNITED STATES.

One can find the historic roots of the United States in Europe. Much of our political, cultural, social, and religious heritage traveled with the initial Europeans that

came to this country. The mass exodus of immigrants that followed further reinforced the ties to Europe. Today we find the second largest Polish city in the world to be Chicago with heavy representation and interest in the issues affecting Poland. Of note is the Polish-American interest in the issue of Poland's membership in NATO. The "Polish American Congress (PAC)" is a fraternal organization, based in both Chicago, Illinois and Washington, D.C. The mission of this Polish-American organization is stated as "Polonia's representative organization in the United States".¹ Of interest is the PAC's stated goal of "aggressively lobbying to get the NATO participation act for Poland passed." This interest reflects Poland's haste to become a full NATO member. In addition the PAC recognizes another major requirement for Poland, "The PAC continues to be instrumental in securing U.S. economic assistance to strengthen democracy and to create a market economy in Poland."

Nearly fifty percent of Americans claim European ancestry or ethnic origin. In the 1990 census 249 million people were counted. 143 million indicated specific foreign ancestry. 87% of these 143 million indicated European ancestry. The bulk of citizens indicated German, Irish, English and Italian heritage.² In this century the United States has been involved in two World Wars and the Cold War in Europe. Enormous American personnel and material resources have been committed to secure Europe from first nationalistic and then ideological threats.

Regardless of this historic commitment we still need to ask - Why is Europe important to the United States today and will it be tomorrow? As a nation we need to openly revisit our assumptions in order to understand where our current vital interests lie.

In a social and political sense, Western Europe shares our commitment to democracy and market economies. No where else will our nation find a more significant set of allies in this regard than the West Europeans. This social and political commitment is manifested in the European membership in NATO, the United Nations/ U.N. Security Council, the G-7 group of major industrialized states, and the International Monetary Fund.

Economically, Western Europe is one of the world's great economic centers. Europe is a massive export market for the United States. Europe was the United States' second largest customer in 1993, taking 31% of U.S. exports of goods and services. Europe was the United States' second largest supplier in 1993, providing 29% of U.S. imports of goods and services. In both cases, the entirety of Asia barely exceeded these figures. Europe generates more of the Gross World Product than any other region. About 50% of U.S. direct investment abroad is in Europe and over 60% of foreign investment in the U.S. is from Europe. Nearly 3 million Americans are employed in the United States by European owned firms and 1.5 million American workers are supported by U.S. exports to Europe. In another economic sense, Europe provides the U.S. with relatively balanced trade with only a \$7 billion U.S. merchandise trade deficit in 1993 compared to \$115 billion for Asia.³

In a November 13, 1995 letter from President Clinton to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President bases the justification for the risky U.S. role in Bosnia on the importance of Europe to the United States: "This Administration, and that of previous Democratic and Republican Presidents, have been firmly committed to the principle that the security and stability of Europe is of fundamental interest to the United States. The conflict in Bosnia is the most dangerous threat to European security since World War II. If the negotiations fail and the war resumes, as it in all probability will, there is a very real risk that it could spread beyond Bosnia, and involve Europe's new democracies as well as our NATO allies. Twice this century, we paid a heavy price for turning our backs to conflict in Europe." ⁴

Clearly, the security of Europe has historically been and is today in the vital national interest of the United States for the myriad social, cultural, political, and economic factors only just highlighted above. The question then becomes - "How do we define security and how is it achieved?"

III. DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY; LESSONS FROM THE MARSHALL PLAN AND TRUMAN DOCTRINE.

Security is often considered only within the narrow context of defense and/or military terms. The Cold War, the possibility of nuclear war, and the huge resources involved in the arms race partly account for this narrow approach to the issue of security. Significant aspects of a necessary, comprehensive security architecture are subordinated and/or neglected. Security includes social, cultural, political, economic and educational elements as well. During my discussions, as an Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, many Americans and Europeans have frequently pointed out that they felt the dialogue on security in the U.S. is too often confined to defense and military issues and not approached comprehensively.

The Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS) is a prestigious, non-governmental policy, think tank. ACUS is a member of a loose coalition of Atlantic Councils, under the auspices of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), established after World War II throughout Western Europe and the United States. The objectives of the ATA are: to educate and inform the public concerning the aims and goals of NATO, to promote solidarity of the peoples of the North Atlantic area, and to develop relations and cooperation between its national member committees or associations. Today Atlantic Councils have been created in former Warsaw Pact countries. The ACUS focus is no longer just Europe. ACUS has a worldwide orientation and spends a considerable amount of time dealing with security issues in the Far East. ⁵

In September of 1995, I was a member of an ACUS delegation whose purpose was to discuss the critical issue of "Further Reins on Nuclear Weapons". ⁶ As General Andrew J. Goodpaster, the head of the delegation and ACUS co-chair, often reminded us

- "Nuclear weapons are the only force that can destroy the United States." The General's close association with President Eisenhower left this and many other lasting impressions and issues that ACUS continues to grapple with today. The delegation visited the capitals of London, Paris, Bonn and Brussels. As we met with various governmental and nongovernmental representatives on the critical issue of further safeguards on nuclear weapons and material the discussions always broadened beyond this greatly important topic to NATO enlargement, the European Union, the possibility of a single European currency, upcoming national political elections, the future of Russia economically and politically, and other topics that many of the Europeans considered essential elements of a discussion on security.

An approach through which we can gain an understanding of the full scope of security is to look at historical precedent. History provides the example of a devastated, post World War II Europe that was quickly sliding into chaos. What factors were considered and what measures were taken that ultimately created a secure Europe? By examining the revitalization of Europe a more complete understanding of security can be achieved. Although there are many significant differences between the 1940's and modern Europe the lessons from this post WW II period have general applicability to the definition and understanding of any nation's or region's security.

In the famous June 4, 1947 speech at Harvard University, the U.S. Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, clearly identifies the problem of European rehabilitation, that is the security of Europe is a multi-faceted problem. "In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy." Marshall goes on to say, "Europe's requirements are ... substantial help from America or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character." This speech launched the "Marshall Plan" whose purpose was the revival of "a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."⁷

Under the rubric of the "Marshall Plan", or more formally the "European Recovery Program (ERP)", four principal areas were addressed to ensure European economic recovery and security.⁸ These four areas were:

- A framework for cooperation (presentation of multi-state, regionally agreed proposals for assistance).
- Trade settlement (the European Payments Union provided a system for settlement of intra-European trade, financed by Marshall Plan money).
- Grant Aid (in the form of both grants and loans)

- Technical assistance (provision of well organized study tours permitting Western Europeans to visit the U.S. and witness the operations, production and management of U.S. firms).

A critical element of the Marshall Plan was the establishment of enduring Western institutions. As Professor Charles Weiss, points out in his "Occasional Paper" on the Marshall Plan: "The enduring legacy of the Marshall Plan and the spirit of cooperation it encouraged is the set of institutions that to this day bind the nations of Western Europe to each other, to the United States, and to the rest of the world: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the European Union (EU). Less well known, but of critical importance during the 1940's and 1950's, were the European Payments Union and the European Productivity Agency".

The "Marshall Plan" focused on economic issues but it was a coherent, concerted, comprehensive approach based on a global vision. As Weiss describes the following essential feature of the plan: "It (the Marshall Plan) was founded on the realization that political and economic stability, military security, and growth are interrelated. President Truman's decision to give aid to Greece and Turkey preceded the Marshall Plan as a direct response to political and military threat, and the formation of NATO came soon afterwards. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the institutions it foreshadowed, and NATO all complemented each other to promote growth, stability, and cooperation in Western Europe and the Euro-Atlantic Community."⁹

Clearly, President Truman and Secretary Marshall envisioned security within a broad context and pursued through various mechanisms a comprehensive revitalization of Europe that included economic, political, social, educational, and defense/military factors. These great men and their vision of security are the reason for the recovery of Europe and its current economic, political, social, cultural, educational and defense status in the world today. Based on this historical review and discussion an overarching definition of security can be formulated and offered.

The following is a broad, comprehensive definition of security that will be the basis for this paper's next evolution. "Security is the broad set of interrelated economic, political, social, cultural, economic, educational, and defense/military factors that influence a nation's and region's ability to economically prosper, provide its citizens physical security, and determine its own historical destiny." This definition of security is not perfect nor is any other. What is important is that one's thinking and the discussions of security be framed within a broad context and not circumscribed to any one set of factors. The danger of a narrow definition is that the factor or factors not considered in the security equation will result in an unstable national, regional or world situation and true security not achieved. If Truman and Marshall had only considered defense/ military factors and relied totally upon the foundation of NATO for security Europe would have most certainly decayed further into chaos.

IV. THE WRONG QUESTION AND DIALOGUE; THE ISSUE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT.

Since the 1940's, the Cold War provided the context for European security. Security was considered within the parameters of an East/West confrontation between members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The likelihood of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union was the overshadowing catastrophic possibility of daily life and defined in large measure European and East/West security. Military and defense issues have been paramount since the end of World War II. Massive expenditures were invested in the armed forces of both the East and West. Never before in history had such colossal and destructive military forces been created.

The largely unexpected end of the Cold War, in 1989, changed the basis for European security. No longer was European security considered within the parameters of an East/West confrontation between members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The Warsaw Pact dissolved as did the Soviet Union. We now considered "Russia" and forced ourselves not to reference the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, our pervasive ideological and physical enemy, had disintegrated. George Kennan's "Policy of Containment", which the U.S. had adopted and pursued for over forty years had succeeded. The West had won the Cold War.

The Cold War had ended, as heralded by the emotional destruction of the Berlin Wall, but there had been a clear understanding of the primary element of security during the Cold War, i.e. defense. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact were a defining and unifying threat for the West. The overall context of security, as well, was defined by largely military and defense parameters. The East and West would have to adjust to new realities. One such reality was that the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union was dissolved. If there was no Warsaw Pact and Russia posed no immediate military threat then what was the purpose of NATO? NATO was established as a military alliance to defend the West. The "North Atlantic Treaty" states "The Parties to this treaty ...are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security'. The defining element of the "North Atlantic Treaty", signed in Washington, D.C., on 4 April 1949, is Article 5. Article 5 states:

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security

Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."¹⁰

Article 5 has never explicitly addressed the "nuclear guarantee" i.e. the United States had extended a nuclear umbrella of defense to NATO partners. Certainly in practice, however, this was the case as evidenced by NATO nuclear war planning and the stationing and sharing of nuclear responsibility on NATO European partner's domestic soil. Article 5 then provides the basis for and strength to the NATO alliance. NATO is possibly the most successful defensive alliance in world history. Although Article 5 is the defining and preeminent element of the North Atlantic Treaty the other thirteen articles do mention other aspects of security e.g. economic policies and political independence.¹¹

Based on the end of the Cold War and that the foundation for NATO, i.e. Article 5, was possibly no longer relevant, led to a necessary reexamination of the mission and role for NATO in the future. Many spoke of NATO searching for a new mission. Others questioned the very existence of NATO. The Russians pointed out that if there was no Warsaw Pact then why was NATO necessary?

A series of events continued to unfold that resulted in NATO rethinking its roles and missions. The July 1990 London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, the November 1991 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, the publication of the Alliance's new Strategic Concept, and consultations among member countries culminated in January 1994 at the NATO Summit meeting in Brussels. The decisions that resulted from this multi-year reexamination of NATO included: reaffirmation of the fundamental charter of NATO, i.e. defense, an invitation to the new Partnership for Peace Program, and an out of NATO area command and control relationship - the Combined Joint Task Forces, which grew out of the requirement for a response to Bosnia.^{12,13}

In addition, the events described since 1989 and NATO's self examination, led to the question and dialogue over "NATO enlargement". Should NATO enlarge? Which countries should be admitted? When? What are the requirements for a country to join NATO? What will be the Russian response to an enlargement of NATO? Should Russia be invited to join? These and many questions, related to NATO enlargement, have consumed the security dialogue with respect to and at the expense of a broader, comprehensive discussion of European security as offered by this paper's definition of security.

The question of "NATO enlargement" is important but not paramount, especially if this dialogue is at the expense of a wider and correctly prioritized addressal of the elements of a secure Europe. A review of the history and current status of the NATO enlargement issue will reveal: the amount of discourse involved, the relative importance of this question, and the problems posed by possible NATO enlargement. Insight will

also be gained, through this review, as to the broad set of factors that compose European security.

The following official positions on "NATO enlargement " will be considered: the U.S. administration, the U.S. Congress, NATO European allies, Central and East European countries, and Russia. Finally, the possible impact on Arms Control and the views of people, from the various countries previously discussed, will be addressed.

A. The Position of the Clinton Administration.

At the January 1994 NATO Summit meeting in Brussels the Clinton Administration proposed expansion of the alliance.¹⁴ The NATO leaders agreed with this proposal. The basis for this proposal was that a range of U.S. interests could be protected by expansion of the alliance. These interests included:

- Strengthening nations that share the U.S. belief in democracy.
- The development of free-market economies open to U.S. investment and trade.
- The securing of allies willing to share in cooperative efforts on a range of global issues.
- Preservation of a Europe free of the domination of any one power.

The U.S. opposed setting explicit criteria for new members; however, general guidelines mentioned by the President included "Countries with repressive political systems, countries with designs on their neighbors, countries with militaries unchecked by civilian control or with closed economic systems need not apply." Timetables for expansion and naming which countries would be invited to join have been opposed by the Administration.¹⁵ It is no secret, however, that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, commonly referred to as the Visegrad Four, are the most likely candidates for membership. Of interest is the initial dialogue, at a U.S.-Russia summit in early May 1995 where Administration officials reportedly discussed the admission of Russia to NATO.¹⁶

The Administration went to the December 1994 NATO summit pushing for and seeking movement on the issue of "NATO enlargement". A clear decision and direct steps in this process was desired. The result, however, due to numerous concerns expressed by NATO allies, was an agreement to study the issue and provide a report by September 1995 addressing the "How and Why". The questions of "Who and When" will require another study which is due by December 1996.¹⁷

The U.S. administration continued to push and clarify its position on enlargement over the next year. On 2 June 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher spoke in Madrid, Spain.¹⁸ His speech titled "Charting a Transatlantic Agenda for the 21st

Century" addressed five key elements for a comprehensive strategy for European security. The first and possibly highest priority of these elements was "adapting and enlarging NATO". The other elements included: strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, supporting Europe's integration and European Union enlargement, and enhancing a European security and defense identity complementary to NATO. The last element cited was "engaging Russia in Europe's security structures."

In March/April of 1995, Richard Holbrooke, the former Ambassador to Germany and then Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, wrote an article for *Foreign Affairs* titled "America, a European Power".¹⁹ He wrote that: "No Issue has been more important, controversial, or misunderstood than whether NATO should remain an alliance of 16 current members or expand, and if it expands, why, where, when, and how?". Holbrooke goes on to stress six points:

- First, the goal remains the defense of the alliance's vital interests and the promotion of European stability. NATO expansion must strengthen security in the region.
- Second, the rationale and process for NATO's expansion must be transparent not secret. Both Warsaw and Moscow will have the opportunity to hear exactly the same presentation from NATO.
- Third, there is no timetable and fourth each nation will be considered individually.
- Fifth, the decisions as to who joins NATO and when will be made exclusively by the alliance. No outside nation will exercise a veto. (e.g. Russia)
- Sixth, although criteria for membership have not been determined certain fundamental precepts reflected in the original Washington treaty remain as valid as they were in 1949.
- Lastly, each new NATO member constitutes for the U.S. the most solemn of all commitments a bilateral defense treaty that extends the U.S. security umbrella to a new nation. This requires ratification by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate.²⁰

Holbrooke continues to further define and clarify the U.S. position in an effort to promote expansion. He cites the former U.S. National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brezezinski's article in the January/February 1995 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Henry Kissinger, and others as advocates of "rapid expansion". Of note is that the word "enlargement" replaces "expansion" after this article due to the sensitivities of Russia and the NATO allies that the word and idea of expansion is more negative and emotional than enlargement.

Continuing the Administration's public and possibly internal clarification, as well, of "NATO enlargement" Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State, writes an article titled "Why NATO Should Grow" which was published on 10 August 1995.²¹ He writes that NATO has decided it should accept new members for three main reasons:

- Collective defense remains an imperative need of European and transatlantic security and central to American engagement in Europe.

- The prospect of being admitted to NATO provides the nations of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union with additional incentives to strengthen their democratic and legal institutions.

- The prospect of membership can foster a greater willingness to resolve disputes and contribute to peace-keeping operations. Thus the process of expansion can help to promote regional stability and peace. Talbott goes on to describe that the enlargement of NATO is not a new issue and discusses the admission of Italy, Germany, Turkey, Greece, and Spain to NATO. He concludes that "One of the most difficult challenges to enlarging NATO is its effect on Russia. Many Russians see NATO as a vestige of the cold war, and inherently directed against their country". Talbott's only response in this article, to the problem Russia poses, is that Russia will not have a veto. NATO is a defensive alliance only and should be so understood, enlargement satisfies requisite central European security concerns, and that NATO enlargement is a "hedge against pessimistic outcomes" in Russia.²²

From the initial urgency and push for enlargement highlighted by the December 1994 proposal in Brussels, through the continued dialogue and clarifications of 1995, the Administration today has fully accepted the NATO study released in September 1995 on the "How and Why" and is working with the other 15 NATO nations on the "Who and When". The acceptance of the need for the NATO studies, which is a purposeful, multi-year slow down of the process, highlights the Administration's more measured current approach to this issue.

The main reasons for this more deliberate approach are Russian sensitivities, the concerns of the NATO allies, and the thinking that resulted from further consideration of this issue in the U.S. and elsewhere. Many Administration officials have pointed out the problem "NATO enlargement" poses for Russia and that this is unquestionably an emotional issue for the Russians. Due to the December 1995 Russian Duma elections and upcoming Russian Presidential elections in June 1996, the Administration has not wanted to isolate democratic forces in Russia over this issue. The Administration has also wanted Russia's assistance with the NATO mission to Bosnia. Clearly an antagonized Russia is not in the U.S. nor NATO interest. Issues such as the possibly enormous costs of enlargement, practical problems of military interoperability, the reality of the ratification by sixteen separate national legislatures, and higher priority security issues have provided further reasons to adopt a careful, studied approach. A Rand study concludes that a conservative estimate of NATO expansion to include the Visegrad states would require \$10-50 billion over ten years, or as much as \$100 billion or more should vigorous measures be required to develop a strong defense posture.²³ These costs are real in terms of military/defense requirements for compatibility but the issue of NATO enlargement has never been purely or possibly even primarily a military issue. It has been and is in fact a political issue as was the historical decision to extend membership to Spain. The cited costs are then only real if in fact invoked by NATO.

This is not to say that the Administration does not currently support NATO enlargement but that numerous broader security considerations, that evolved over this issue, have led to the current, slower, and more careful approach by the Administration today. An examination of this issue in Congress reveals a parallel example.

B. The Actions and Positions in the U.S. Congress.

In October 1994, Congress passed the "NATO Participation Act of 1994". The Act expressed "the sense of Congress" that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia should be considered for NATO membership. The Act also stated that the President "may establish" a program to provide security assistance to these four countries and others designated by the President as having made progress towards the goals of the Partnership for Peace. The Republicans "Contract with America" contains, as an element, support for the rapid integration and enlargement of NATO to the Visegrad Four.²⁴

Clearly, domestic politics are at work. As previously discussed, ethnic minorities throughout the U.S. have lobbied both the Administration and the Congress over the issue of NATO enlargement for their respective countries of national origin.

House Republicans offered the "National Security Act of 1995" in December 1994 as part of its agenda for the forthcoming Congress.²⁵ It proposed that the United States commit itself to a "strong and viable NATO", that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia should be invited to join NATO by January 10, 1999 provided each met certain criteria and that the President "may establish" a program to assist in their transition to full NATO membership.²⁶

On 16 February 1995, House Resolution 7, the National Security Revitalization Act, Title VI, the "NATO Expansion Act of 1995", was passed. The Senate has a companion bill, S 602. The common elements of both bills is a description of the basic NATO mission i.e. collective defense and that this mission should be clarified in the post-Cold War era. Each bill also names and states that the four Visegrad countries should become NATO members, if they meet certain standards, mandates establishment of a program to assist in their transition to NATO membership and restates that the Senate must agree by two-thirds vote amending the Washington Treaty and admitting any new members. Both bills amend the 1994 NATO Participation Act by directing the President to establish a program of assistance to facilitate the transition of the Visegrad Four to NATO membership.²⁷

On 22 June 1995, Senator Sam Nunn, the well respected and influential Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), gave a speech to the "SACLANT Seminar 1995".²⁸ The speech entitled, "The Future of NATO in an Uncertain World" first highlights how different the European security environment is today and the changes it has undergone. He points out the multilateral security system which is forming across Europe that reduces nuclear and conventional armaments and

makes a surprise attack by Russian conventional military forces against the West increasingly unlikely. Nunn reflects on the accomplishments of the numerous strategic arms accords. "Today our military planners estimate that preparation for a Russian conventional military attack, even against Eastern Europe, would take several years at a minimum...assuming the resources could be found to rebuild the undermanned, underfunded, poorly trained and poorly disciplined Russian military establishment". However, he is quick to point out: "While Russia would take years to mount a sustained military threat to eastern Europe, it can within weeks or months exert severe external and internal pressure on its immediate neighbors to the west -- including the Baltic countries and Ukraine. Moreover-- because a conventional attack is infeasible a higher alert status for strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is more likely."

Senator Nunn's major points in this speech outline the possible cost of ignoring Russian concerns over NATO enlargement: "This audience is well aware that Russia currently possesses over 20,000 nuclear weapons, at least 40 thousand tons of chemical weapons, advance biological warfare capabilities, hundreds of tons of fissile material, huge stores of conventional weapons plus thousands of scientists and technicians skilled in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction". Nunn states that the "number one security threat for America, for NATO, and for the world are these capabilities and their proliferation." His major point in this regard is the power of Russia and that "Russia will be a major factor, for better or worse, across the entire spectrum of actual and potential threats". He believes that the issue of NATO enlargement must be considered within this context.

Of special note is Senator Nunn's admonition that: "We must avoid being so preoccupied with NATO enlargement that we ignore the consequences it may have for even more important security priorities. In short, if NATO enlargement stays on its current course, reaction in Russia is likely to be a sense of isolation by those committed to democracy and economic reform, with varying degrees of paranoia, nationalism, and demagoguery emerging from across the current political spectrum."

Senator Nunn has continued to voice these concerns with respect to the impact of possible NATO enlargement on Russia. After release of the September 1995, "NATO Study on Enlargement", a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators joined Nunn in voicing concern over enlargement.²⁹ On 10 October 1995, numerous speeches were made on the Senate floor reference Senate concern over this issue. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, a SASC member, stated that: "Providing full NATO membership to Eastern Europe has the potential to draw the United States and our NATO allies into regional border and ethnic disputes in which we have no demonstratable national security interest. Furthermore rather than strengthening stability and security in Eastern Europe, repercussions in Russia from rapid NATO expansion could undermine our most important national security goals. The expansion of NATO is a strategic decision that must not be made in haste." Once again Senator Nunn reiterated his major points from the June 1995 speech and emphasized that, "We must avoid being so preoccupied with NATO enlargement that we ignore the consequences it may have for even more important priorities".³⁰

The history of the enlargement issue in both the U.S. administration and the Congress indicates an initial, possibly not well formulated, desire and push for rapid expansion. As this issue evolved, further thinking completed, and the dialogue expanded a more cautious, measured and deliberate approach has resulted. Other security factors with possibly and probably higher priorities most certainly presented themselves.

Continuing this examination now leads to the NATO European allies.

C. The Position of the NATO European Allies.

There are a wide variety of positions on the issue of enlargement in Europe. Some Europeans support rapid enlargement. Former Danish Foreign Minister, Uffe Ellemann Jensen, has expressed the view that NATO enlargement should have proceeded two years ago, that Russia should not dictate NATO policy, and that the time to expand NATO is when the threat is low and not provocative. He believes that the people of these countries should enjoy the rights that we, in the West, do now and that NATO enlargement will create the conditions for further security and support of democratic forces in Central Europe. Parallel views have been expressed by some foreign policy experts in Great Britain as well.³¹

German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, has stated that "Germany cannot remain indefinitely Europe's eastern Boundary."³² Germany and its Chancellor seemed to initially favor early enlargement but now favor a more measured approach that fully considers the impact of Russia and her concerns over this issue. The Chancellor believes that enlargement should move forward if a cooperative framework with Russia can be developed and ethnic tensions in Europe can be calmed. Kohl and other senior German leaders have emphasized that reform in Russia must be on a steady path and that "NATO enlargement" must not create anxiety in Moscow.³³ Since the end of World War II, Germany's foreign policy has been founded on improved and good relations with the Soviet Union and now Russia. Russia's concerns over NATO enlargement run counter to this position. The current, cautious German approach to this issue is consistent with long standing German foreign policy.

Another concern expressed in Europe, especially France, is that this issue will dilute the original mission of NATO and that the new members cannot be readily defended.³⁴ The problem of multiple and different NATO status has been discussed. Due to Russian concerns, will NATO not station forces on the territory of new members? Will there be different categories of nations within NATO in the future? Some Europeans have gone so far as to say that enlargement will ultimately destroy NATO due to the eventual negative effects on the solidarity of the original sixteen NATO nations.

Europeans, such as Chancellor Kohl, have recommended that other broader security institutions, such as the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are better suited to bring stability vice a military

institution such as NATO.³⁵ Another similar view is that membership and integration into these institutions should proceed in parallel to an expanded NATO.

Overall the pattern of initial support for rapid expansion and then a more cautious, slower approach has been officially adopted by the NATO European allies.³⁶ This more deliberate approach manifested itself in the form of the requirement for two separate studies of this issue. The first, year long, study was released on 29 September 1995 and provides general answers to the questions of the "Why and How" of enlargement.³⁷ This study certainly highlights the Russian concerns and broadens the dialogue on European security. In Chapter 2, "Relations with Russia", are highlighted and the study points out the "important contribution Russia has with regard to European stability and security". The study cites that, "In June 1994, NATO and Russia agreed to set in train the development of a far-reaching, cooperative NATO-Russia relationship aimed at enhancing mutual confidence and openness." This study further opens the dialogue on Russian concerns and states: "Russia has raised concerns with respect to the enlargement process of the Alliance. The Alliance is addressing these concerns in developing its wider relationship with Russia and the Alliance has made it clear that the enlargement process including the associated military arrangements will threaten no one and contribute to a developing broad European security architecture..".

The second study, due in December 1996, is intended to answer the questions of "Who and When".³⁸ Many believe that the Visegrad Four will be invited individually to join NATO. Once the invitation is extended, the process of qualification and joining is expected to take a minimum of two years to meet the requirements of membership. In total, over four years will have elapsed since the initial NATO summit and early calls for rapid NATO expansion.

D. The Positions of the Central Europeans/Candidates for NATO Membership.

Generally, a principal interest of most of the Central and even East European states in joining NATO is gaining Article 5 guarantees, due to their concerns with a resurgent and historically aggressive and dominant Russia.³⁹ This concern has a basis. U.S. Ambassador Rowny, former START negotiator, has visited Moscow several times recently and is concerned that the Russian strategic outlook may not have changed. Rowny states that despite many changes he believes: "The most significant conclusion is that despite unmistakable changes taking place in Russia, most of the changes are superficial. Beneath the surface the hard core of Cold War thinking remains in the domain of the Russian military." ⁴⁰

The most unequivocal and strident position with regard to Russia's resurgence is Poland's. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, is Poland's Deputy Chairman, Parliamentary Committee on Defense, and has spoken to many U.S. audiences expressing his country's desire for immediate NATO membership.⁴¹ Poland wants to join the West and break out of its historical predicament, i.e. of being caught between East and West, and never

being equitably integrated into either sphere of influence . Poland's history is one of external domination, conquest, and territorial division by the great powers of the East and West. Poland has been dominated by Russia for most of the last two-hundred years. Other countries, such as Germany and Austria, have also taken their turns partitioning and exploiting Poland.

In a paper, prepared for the "1995 NATO Symposium" in Washington, D.C., Andrzej Karkoszka, the Director of the Polish Ministry of National Defence, states that: "In the Polish Eyes Europe continues to be divided. A desire to break out from such a geopolitical predicament is the strongest motivation for the Polish society's willingness to go through the pains of economic reforms and for its pro-Western drive. This is also the main argument for joining NATO".⁴² Karkoszka goes on to say that: "Today there is no outstanding issue of contention which could be seen as a potential cause of bilateral conflict. In contrast to this optimistic outlook of the present situation, the long term analysis of Poland's external security risks looks more bleakly. The whole land mass beyond the eastern border of Poland is in flux. ...The most unpredictable is of course, the future of Russia, a superpower still not reconciled with her new, circumscribed role. The security of every state in Russia's vicinity is decisively shaped by her external policy".

Poland is of course not the only country interested in NATO membership, the President of Bulgaria, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, in a speech before the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria on 17 April 1995, states that two conditions are required to build a new security system in Europe. "I see two conditions for its creation: the eastward enlargement of NATO and the success of the democratic changes in Russia." He goes on to say that "It is vital for Bulgaria to file a clear and unambiguous application for NATO membership."⁴³

Other countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Baltics also strongly express their desire for NATO membership as their highest priority, security goal.^{44 45} It is important to note that although these countries may all desire membership their likelihood for membership varies between each country. In fact, much of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) process in Mons, Belgium seemed to the NATO PFP coordinating cell there as a race and competition to join NATO vice a separate and distinct PFP process. To date, forty-three nations are participating in PFP and much of at least the initial motivation to join PFP was due to the view that PFP is a path and a prerequisite for NATO membership.

E. The Russian Position.

NATO enlargement is a highly emotional issue in Russia.⁴⁶ The Russians are consistent in their extremely negative, official responses to this issue. These concerns must be treated as genuine and considered with respect to the many possible Russian responses to this issue. What are the possibilities for a broad European security if NATO enlarges and Russia responds with specific negative acts? - Has European security been enhanced or degraded? Can security be achieved in Europe if Russia herself is not secure?

In order to understand Russia's position on "NATO enlargement " one must consider Russia's history, most recent historical experience, and current domestic and international situation. Russia has historically considered herself intentionally isolated. Since the end of the World War II, the world has been viewed as bipolar; East versus West and the United States/NATO versus the Soviet Union /Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union was a superpower. The strategy pursued successfully by the United States and her allies was one of "Containment of the Soviet Union". Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia has lost overall international superpower status.

Russia, though, remains a powerful nation. Russia represents eighty percent of the land mass and resources of the former Soviet Union. Today the Russian population is more homogenous, approximately eighty percent are ethnic Russians.⁴⁷ As previously discussed, Russia most certainly remains a nuclear superpower. Russia's current inventory and potential for further development and proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction is enormous.

Against this background, Russia is facing historically unparalleled challenges. From the ground up, Russia is simultaneously attempting to build a democratic state and market economy after a forty year experience of one party Communism and a totally centralized, defense focused economy. Russia must integrate into the post-industrial, higher technical, and information age. The basic understandings, education, and institutions required for this transformation are nonexistent. As Dr. Weiss points out in his "Occasional Paper" on the Lessons of the Marshall Plan: "The transformation required today is much more fundamental, as the complete construction of a new legal, political and economic framework is needed. ...The problem is different and more complex today. The countries of the CEE and FSU are not suffering from physical destruction like that of post-war Europe, but rather from the need to replace a collapsed authoritarian economic and political system."

The December 1995 Duma elections in Russia witnessed the Communists and their nationalist allies winning approximately one-third of the seats.⁴⁸ The upcoming Russian Presidential elections are worrisome in this regard. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that nationalist forces and the Communists could return to power. The first election is being held on June 16th and the second ballot on July 3rd, 1996. The innumerable problems Russia is facing are strongly manifesting themselves as central issues in the election debate.

Domestic issues, primarily the economy, are the most important considerations for the individual Russian. NATO enlargement, although not a domestic issue, has been used effectively by nationalist and Communist elements as representing Russia's loss of superpower status. Russia has failed to secure admission to Western institutions, including the G-7, NATO, European Community and the Council of Europe. Russia has found no new alliances. Moscow once again feels isolated; although Russia is not without blame for this current international situation.

In 1989, over eighty percent of the centralized Russian economy was committed to defense. Conversion to a full market economy will take generations⁴⁹. The Russian government is consuming thirty-seven percent of the gross domestic product. The conversion of the Russian economy has had some success, most notably in the agricultural sector; however, there is still an increased reliance on food imports. The record of foreign investment is poor and estimates total approximately \$1 billion. The record on the establishment of small businesses is poor. Many goods are available but beyond the reach of the majority of Russians. There has been a continued economic recession and a fall in the standard of living for a majority of the population. The social safety net is nearly nonexistent for the average Russian today. There has been an incredible proliferation of crime. The average Russian no longer feels socially nor physically safe.⁵⁰ Against this thumb-nail sketch of the current situation in Russia we can move to the Russian thinking on "NATO enlargement".

Dr. Sergey Rogov is the Director of the Institute of the United States of America and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He has frequently discussed, with NATO and U.S. officials, the Russian attitudes toward NATO's expansion. In an October 1995 paper, he details the thinking of Russians with respect to this issue.⁵¹ The following summarize Rogov's six major points.

--The conservative/nationalist opposition in Russia is the main force which is exploiting the anti-NATO sentiments in Russia. The opposition explains all Russia's misfortunes as the result of a sinister conspiracy by the West and its strike force, NATO.

--Many top governmental officials, key military figures and influential members of the Yeltsin administration and the Security Council perceive future expansion as a move directed against Russia, at least politically.

--The position of democratic organizations and their leaders is ambiguous. Some view NATO with sympathy as an important element of European and world stability, allowing U.S. participation in European affairs. But almost all politicians are taking into account the existing anti-NATO sentiment in Russia.

--The domestic difficulties and international isolation in Russia have resulted in a greater emphasis by the Russian leadership on symbolic gestures aimed at demonstrating the great power status of Russia.

--Cooperation between Russia and NATO has not reached the level necessary to ensure lasting stability. Russia's perception of NATO can be seen through the Soviet description of NATO in 1990 - "a military bloc of capitalist countries under American leadership, directed against the USSR and other peaceful countries." Russia takes the problem of NATO enlargement as a major challenge for its foreign policy. Russians believe the

West may wish to take advantage of Moscow's present weakness and no matter how NATO expansion is packaged Russians will treat it as a threat to Russia.

--The key problems of European security inevitably involve Russia. The Western attitude is seen as a "zero sum game" which contributes to the Russians' feeling of isolation.

In an ACUS meeting on May 7, 1996, Russian Colonel General Leontiy P. Shevtsov, Deputy for Russian Forces in IFOR and a member of the Russian General Staff, was asked his views on this issue.⁵² His reply was consistent with other official Russian positions. He stated that: "NATO enlargement and increased cooperation between NATO and Russia is not possible. What would the U.S. think about five Russian divisions in Mexico? Enlargement will begin a second round of the Cold War and arms race. Russia will search for a new security bloc and this will probably be to the East." Interestingly, in a policy game conducted during April 1996 at ACUS the outcome was the eventual move, by the players representing Russia, toward the East and specifically China to offset Russian concerns over NATO enlargement. Colonel General Shevtsov stated that "adding two or more countries to NATO was not as important as good relations with Russia and that both Russia, NATO's, and the U.S. primary goal should be improved and good relations". He concluded by pointing out that an expanded NATO membership would mean "drawing new dividing lines in Europe".

These same sentiments were also expressed by Russian Ambassador Cherkin during the ACUS delegation visit to Brussels in the Fall of 1995. Of special note is the linkage to arms control that he and other Russians have voiced. Threats to both strategic and conventional arms control have been voiced by the Russians. Most certainly NATO enlargement will affect the specifics of these all important treaties. Of paramount concern and importance to the entire world is the continued viability of the strategic and conventional arms control treaties.

F. The impact of possible NATO enlargement on the Arms Control Treaties.

Russia has officially stated that the enlargement of NATO will affect the Arms Control Agreements.⁵³ Currently START II has been ratified by the U.S. Senate and remains to be passed by the Russian Duma. START I limited the number of nuclear warheads to 6000 accountable deployed weapons and the launchers to 1600. START II would reduce actual deployed warheads to the 3000/3500 level. No one envisions passage of START II until after the Russian Presidential elections.⁵⁴ The results of the election could impact on the political fate of START II.

The "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)" has been heralded as the cornerstone of European security. The CFE treaty has been called the "greatest legacy of the Cold War" by one U.S. official, "absolutely essential for European security" by a senior European diplomat" and "the core of a future collective security system in Europe" by the Russian Foreign Ministry. The preamble to the Treaty describes its

objectives as follows: "Strengthening stability and security in Europe through the creation of balanced conventional forces; establishing lower levels for conventional armaments/equipment; eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and, as a priority, precluding the capability for launching surprise attacks or large-scale offensive operations."⁵⁵

The Treaty was signed in Paris on November 19, 1990 by heads of state or government of the 22 members of NATO and the former Warsaw Treat Organization. Following the reunification of Germany, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and the separation of Czechoslovakia into the Czech and Slovak Republics the total number of signatories increased to thirty.

The treaty has been extremely successful and achieved its overall goals of preventing even the possibility of a "Blitzkrieg" type attack in Europe. There has been the verified destruction of 50,000 major pieces of military equipment or "Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE)", which includes artillery, tanks, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and helicopters. 2,500 on-site inspections have been conducted which has resulted in an unprecedented openness of military installations. It is reported that implementation "of most of the provisions of this complex Treaty has generally been smooth."⁵⁶

In an April 1996 article, for *Arms Control Today*, Jack Mendelsohn addresses the problem that NATO expansion presents for the "future of the CFE regime". He points out that allies have adopted the narrow argument that NATO as such is not a signatory of the CFE Treaty and therefore, from a legal point of view, NATO's enlargement per se has no impact on the Treaty. Mendelsohn continues this discussion and notes: "Some Russians have been considerably more explicit about their view of the relationship between NATO enlargement and CFE; it would be grounds for treaty abrogation or replacement. Defense Minister Grachev has warned that if NATO expands Russia "would not abide by the CFE Treaty" would consider creating new armed forces "on the most threatened fronts" and would forge closer security ties among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

There is no question that if NATO enlarges the CFE Treaty, the declared cornerstone of European security, would as a minimum need to be amended. The treaty is based on group vice national limits of Treaty Limited Equipment and with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the incorporation of new states into NATO, the basis for the treaty is eroded.

Of additional concern is the ongoing international dialogue over Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) and the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Defense (ABM) Treaty. The unequivocal Russian position is that ABM is the basis for the Strategic Arms Accords and changes to or U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty threatens that regime. In a May 1, 1996 letter to Senator Nunn from General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated: "Efforts which suggest changes to or withdrawal from the

ABM treaty may jeopardize Russian ratification of START II and ... could prompt Russia to withdraw from START I. ... I am concerned that failure of either START initiative will result in Russian retention of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons, thereby increasing both the costs and risks we may face."⁵⁷

It is clear that there will be an impact on the incredibly complex and interrelated Arms Control Treaties if NATO enlarges. The manifestation and seriousness of that impact is not possible to predict.

G. The Publics' Views.

The views of the publics, in the various countries involved in possible NATO enlargement, is important for several reasons. In the West, the national legislatures will necessarily need to approve the admission of new members. The U.S. Senate has voiced concerns and reminders that approval to increase NATO membership will require two-thirds Senate ratification. As previously discussed, there has already been considerable domestic lobbying over this issue. What will be the U.S. public's reaction to the obligation to defend possible new countries with American armed forces and to widen the U.S. nuclear umbrella to the east in Europe? The people of Central and Eastern Europe, struggling to establish democracy will become increasingly involved in the ramifications, obligations, and costs of NATO membership. Will these people be supportive of possible increased defense expenditures vice domestic spending?

In September 1995, the United States Information Agency (USIA), Office of Research and Media Reaction, published its findings with regard to how "Publics assess the building blocks of European security."⁵⁸ This report was based on USIA public opinion surveys and focus groups and U.S. surveys conducted during 1994 and 1995. The following summarizes the results of this report.

--**The View from America.** A majority of Americans support NATO but fewer than half want to see NATO expanded eastward, given the added responsibility of defending a region most do not perceive as vital to U.S. interests. For example, in one survey 91% favor using U.S. troops to defend Western Europe, 60% favor defending Poland, and 21% favor defending Ukraine. The survey concludes that "Taken as a whole, U.S. survey results suggest that a decision to widen NATO membership eastward may face considerable public opposition."

--**The View from Western Europe.** The Europeans favor a reduced U.S. role in NATO and an increased European control and responsibility. On the average six in ten or more support allowing Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO. West Europeans see the expansion of NATO as a logical and essential consequence of the disappearance of the Iron Curtain and the need to widen European unity based on shared democratic values. Most prefer to move slowly on this issue due to potential reactions in Russia. West European publics support eventual Russian NATO membership seeing the exclusion of Russia as an enormous affront.

--**The View from Central and Eastern Europe.** Contrary to conventional wisdom, support for full NATO membership is soft. There is a serious disconnect between the desire to become a full member of the alliance and willingness to perform perhaps the most basic membership requirement--sending one's troops to defend another NATO country. Only in Poland does the majority, by approximately 55%, support sending troops to defend another NATO nation and the stationing of NATO troops in Poland. The majority of Bulgarians, Czechs, Hungarians, and Slovaks oppose regular NATO exercises, NATO overflights, or increasing the proportion of the national budget for military vice social needs. Opposition to Russia eventually becoming a NATO member is not widespread.

--**The View from Russia.** Russian attitudes about NATO are ambiguous, largely due to the fact that the public is poorly informed about the alliance. Russians are more likely to oppose NATO membership for Central and Eastern Europeans. The current debate in Russia over NATO expansion is mainly a discourse confined to the moderately to well informed.

Section IV, Conclusions.

It is clear that the issue of "NATO enlargement" is extremely problematic and has been the focus of much debate and concern. While not exclusively the only subject discussed, with respect to security in Europe, it has in large measure been at the expense of a broad security dialogue. At the same time the debate over this issue has in fact illuminated some aspects of a wider security architecture for Europe. Using a broad definition of security, recommendations may be formulated.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS.

Security was previously defined in this paper as "The broad set of interrelated economic, political, social, cultural, educational, and defense/military factors that influence a nation's and region's ability to economically prosper, provide its citizens physical security, and determine its own historical destiny." In light of the previous discussion, it is clear that this broad definition has more utility and provides a greater understanding. The recommendations that will be now be presented, to enhance European security, are based on this definition.

Three categories of recommendations will be offered: thinking, policy, and actions/institutions.

A. THINKING.

Old thinking and habits die hard. The Cold War legacy of a "zero sum" game, where only one side can take an advantage at the expense of the other, permeates much of the current thought on security. Old thinking consists of national and alliance strategies based on "balance of power" and the idea of "exclusion". Beginning with the events of 1989, an historic opportunity to change the world order has presented itself. Many scholars have pointed to the 1990's as a period, analogous to the post World War II time frame, when tremendous possibilities and opportunities existed for international change. Certainly the examples of France and Germany and the United States and Japan, serve as examples of bitter enemies that reversed their previous relationship and are now strategic allies. Ultimately, there can be no secure Europe without a secure Russia. As previously discussed, Russia's geopolitical position, resources, and national potential will continue to directly influence European security. New thinking is required to deal with the realities of Russia and the new international situation and opportunities presented.

Atlantic Council Co-Chair, General Andrew J. Goodpaster, believes that an "overarching relationship and framework of cooperation and friendship" must be the basis for U.S. - Russian relations.⁵⁹ "Day to day, month to month, specific issues and interests would be subordinated. It is in the interest of both the United States and Russia that Russia be welcomed as a full participant in the community of nations, that it become a country in which democracy and a free market are developing, and one which shares the aim of a stable and peaceful world." In a series of monographs and speeches he has presented this defining concept for the future. He has offered this concept as the basis for "new thinking". General Goodpaster points to the numerous common interests both the U.S. and NATO share with Russia: "Both countries will gain by reducing nuclear danger to an absolute minimum. Neither faces an external threat commensurate with the mutually adversarial posture of the past. Neither wants to see a new "line" drawn in Europe which would exclude Russia. Both want to see stability and non-threatening relationships among the nations of Europe." The nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protection of the environment, combatting organized crime and illegal drug trade are further examples of shared common U.S. - Russian interests.

General Goodpaster argues that: "The pattern of relationship between Russia and the United States, if developed along constructive lines, can assist in the wider process of building stable, peaceful relations for Russia with other countries in Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and elsewhere..⁶⁰

In a October 11, 1995, speech to the U.S. - Russia Business Forum, Sergei A. Karaganov, Chairman of the Board, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in Moscow, noted that "A general strategic partnership props up both the U.S. and Russia and that neither country can manage globally without the other." From the Russian perspective, Karaganov as well highlighted the numerous common interests of the U.S. and Russia. Sergey Rogov has emphasized that "Inclusion of Russia must be the priority issue for the West." Numerous Russians and Europeans have also pointed out the problems of "old thinking" and share the view that General Goodpaster's concept of and thinking about an "overarching relationship" makes profound sense. As the "USIA public opinion" survey

discovered the people of West, Central and Eastern Europeans felt that Russia must be included in the processes of the West and integrated into the newly formed and established security institutions and structures.

How do we proceed from and implement this "new thinking" and "overarching relationship"?

B. POLICY.

Certainly the conscious recognition and adoption of the policy of an "overarching relationship of cooperation and friendship" must be adopted by international policy makers. In this case declarations, by heads of state and senior policy makers is essential and establishes the concept and framework that will direct the current and future U.S. and Russian relationship. Adoption of this concept requires a voiced prioritization as well. To establish and strengthen European security this new thinking and concept must be of first priority to U.S., European, and Russian leaders. Based upon the recognition and prioritization of this concept, specific actions must occur if the policy and thinking is to come to fruition and ultimately be implemented.

C. ACTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS.

As a first step, the current U.S. "National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" codified in a February 1996 publication,⁶¹ could declare this policy and priority. Currently the concept of "Engagement and Enlargement" makes a good case for avoiding U.S. isolationism but is not strong on the priority and importance of Russia to U.S. and European security. President Clinton has declared his vision of "a free and undivided Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok". The concept of "the overarching relationship", in fact, fits well within the administrations's strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement" and vision for Europe. The 1996 publication also accords too much space and therefore implied priority to "NATO enlargement", although other security issues, such as economic and political concerns, are certainly highlighted.

With respect to the "Marshall Plan", Dr. Weiss offers specific recommendations for a "policy that will be as effective (as the Marshall Plan) in promoting liberal democracy and economic reform in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe."⁶² Weiss calls for a "strong American response" and "commitment". He offers seven specific recommendations that consider a broad concept of security.

--Encourage Adequate Levels of Grant Assistance. It is crucial that the current level of aid to the countries of the CEE and FSU and a high proportion of grants in order to avoid burdensome debt.

--Improve Technical Assistance. The countries of the FSU and CEE urgently need to increase production and productivity. The current effort is too small. Technical assistance programs should be reoriented to bring large numbers of people from these countries to the U.S., Western Europe, and the Pacific Rim for short-term, narrowly focused and result oriented study tours.

--Establish a Joint Economic Council to Aid Russian Integration.

--Support Independent News Media and Public Policy Non-Governmental Organizations. Much creative and independent thinking has been accomplished under the auspices of organizations similar to ACUS. A modern hallmark of democracies is the non-governmental organizations and their valued role in thinking about policy and making recommendations for same. NGO's have blossomed throughout the East. Maximum effectiveness of these organizations requires coordination and recognition.

--Revive Intra-Regional Trade and Trade with Western Europe.

--Encourage Defense Conversion.

--Improve Coordination and Effectiveness. A comprehensive evaluation and coordination of the numerous programs of assistance needs to be established and direction/guidance provided.

Turning to another institution and its work is the, less well known, Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation, more commonly referred to as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.⁶³ This institution provides a successful example of a broad definition of security being employed. Under the direction of Vice-President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin a public-private institution was initiated. The commission has been heralded as "a ground breaking institution in the conduct of American foreign policy" by the U.S.-Russia Business Council. The work of the commission is focused on three principal strategic areas: trade and trade investment, space and science, health and environment. Some of this commission's accomplishments include: the encouragement of and contracts for U.S. private investment in Russia; the contract to jointly build with Russia a space station; the identification of assistance for Russia from the U.S. private health sector in a number of areas; U.S. assistance with the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and safeguard of nuclear material.

This largely unheralded institution and its work is addressing broad elements of overall European security. An obvious recommendation is to allow this institution to continue its work and consider creating additional, specifically focused government-private endeavors modeled on this effort. Wide security issues are and can be further addressed through such forums. The cultural, social, and educational aspects of security seem most suited to the government-private partnership initiatives.

The G-7, World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund have macroeconomic roles to play that are crucial for the continued progress and development of the newly emerging market economies.

Russia must not be passive in these efforts and continue her efforts at economic reform. The development of the private sector and foreign private investment is critical. The agricultural and energy sectors must as well be reviewed for progress to a market economy and assistance requested and provided.

In a political sense, the West must encourage the foundations of democracy. Democratic elements in Russia should be supported and actions by the West that negatively impact on these fragile democratic forces must be avoided. The issue of "NATO enlargement" is one such issue. Senior policy makers must carefully review this issue within this context and consider the impact of "enlargement" on the future of Russian democratic forces.

All of the international political institutions must be used to foster a "policy of inclusion" for Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These institutions include the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The OSCE has a broad, international mandate and membership to include Russia. The OSCE record has been successful in overseeing several peacekeeping operations. Dr. Rogov and other notable Russians have called for an increased role for the OSCE and authority to coordinate peacekeeping operations. This organization especially has the potential, as a supranational body and complementary institution, to provide legitimacy and pursue/further establish a policy of inclusion, especially with regard to Russia.

Obviously the United Nations, the European Union, and the Council of Europe, in both an economic and political sense, have roles to play. All of these institutions and many others, if viewed in a complementary sense, can contribute to the "overarching relationship" and an articulated, prioritized policy of "inclusion".

Although it has been argued and defined by this paper that security consists of a wide range of factors, military and defense issues are essential. Many solid recommendations have been offered by numerous government and private thinkers on this matter. Colonel General Shevtsov and other Russian officials firmly believe that Russia and NATO must have an established, friendly, cooperative relationship. Shevtsov has recommended a treaty of cooperation. He views a path of military guarantees, exchanges, and joint exercises as essential to relieve the concerns of the central and eastern Europeans. At NATO a mechanism of 16 nations plus one, i.e. Russia is necessary.

Continued active participation then of Russia in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) of NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) would as well provide

avenues for Russian and central/eastern European "inclusion". Russia should participate in and pursue all of these avenues and not dismiss their value. Certainly PFP has provided an avenue for participation, coordination, and understanding between the forty-three nations now participating. The "Marshall Legacy Symposium, Partnerships for the Future", sponsored by the U.S. National Guard, January 8-12 in Washington D.C., was clear evidence of many disparate PFP nations working and succeeding at better understanding each other and establishing relationships. These efforts must continue and be supported. To many observers, PFP accomplishes many of the defense and military security objectives of "NATO", without the detractors that accompany enlargement of the NATO alliance.

The current NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) mission in Bosnia also provides a template for further NATO and Russian cooperation. Bosnian Serb mistrust of NATO, heightened after the NATO bombardment, required the participation of Russia in any peace accord for Bosnia. Per General George A. Joulwan, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, "The Dayton peace accord has resulted in the most significant military and political cooperation with Russia since World War II...NATO and Russia have taken historic steps for future military cooperation."⁶⁴ General Joulwan states that, "This is only the beginning of a new NATO-Russia relationship. This cooperation can become an enduring framework for partnership into the next century." Russian Colonel General Shetsov also believes that the NATO-Russian military effort has been "fully successful"; however, he is quick to point out that "Russian and American success will only be lasting if a final political settlement is reached."⁶⁵

The Western European Union (WEU) consists of twenty-seven countries and is the defense component of the European Union. This organization, in a complementary and parallel institutional role, can provide additional options for European defense. The WEU believes that "it is a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and is playing a growing role in the field of crisis prevention and management activities."⁶⁶ Based on the current status of the WEU it is difficult to imagine the WEU replacing NATO; however, a distinctly European defensive alliance has utility. One could envision a scenario where the WEU, as a purely European entity, could be used to give legitimacy and implement an operation when U.S. and Canadian participation might be a political liability to the operation. The WEU could also be the implementing organization if the U.S., for its own reasons, did not want to participate and the Europeans felt strongly enough to conduct a solely European operation.

VI. CONCLUSIONS.

This paper has argued for an understanding that national and regional security must be considered within a broad context. The numerous interrelated factors of security must be understood and addressed. The security of Europe is most certainly in the vital national interest of the United States. An architecture for European security must provide for the "inclusion" of Russia, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe.

Recommendations have been offered by numerous statesman and scholars that comprehensively address security. These recommendations must begin with "new thinking and concepts" and move to the implementation of that thought through clearly prioritized policies and actions, that are implemented by viable institutions.

It has not been the intent to argue whether NATO should or should not enlarge nor to provide a recommendation for same. Rather the objective has been to use the issue and dialogue surrounding enlargement to define, prioritize and then provide recommendations for a broader approach to security. Finally, with respect to enlargement our senior policy makers must consider the broader ramifications of this issue on the other aspects of security. Does enlargement, when viewed within this broad context of security, enhance or detract from security?

AUTHOR'S NOTE.

This paper is presented in satisfaction of the U.S. Army War College requirement for a Senior Fellows Research Paper.

The paper represents the culmination of a year of listening and learning at the Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS). The thought presented here is a personal synthesis and amalgamation of the combined wisdom and thinking present in ACUS. Of special note is the great impact, on this officer, of General Andrew Goodpaster, Mr. David Acheson, Dr. Al Wilhelm, the ACUS Program Directors, Assistant Program Directors, and the senior U.S. and foreign national fellows. Through innumerable conversations, meetings, and dialogue at ACUS, with these senior statesman, scholars, and military officers, my thinking on these issues developed and became focused. Special thanks to Mr. Jesse Drake and Ms. Theoni Xintaris for their terrific assistance with the day to day conduct of the ACUS Senior Fellows Program.

END NOTES.

¹ Information Paper, Polish American Congress, April 1996.

² United States Security Strategy, Department of Defense, June 1995, p.4.

- 3 Ibid, pp.3-4.
- 4 Presidential Letter to the Congressional Speaker of the House, The White House, November 13, 1995.
- 5 NATO Office of Information, *NATO Handbook*, 1995, pp.210-212.
- 6 "Nuclear Weapons and European Security", Bulletin, The Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS), October 31, 1995.
- 7 Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Remarks at Harvard University, Department of State, June 4, 1947.
- 8 Charles Weiss, JR, *The Marshall Plan: Lessons for U.S. Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, Occasional Paper, ACUS, December 1995.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 NATO Office of Information, *NATO Handbook*, 1995, pp. 231-232.
- 11 Ibid, pp. 232-234.
- 12 Gebhardt Von Moltke, "NATO Moves Towards Enlargement", *NATO Overview*, January 1996.
- 13 Dan Hamilton, "Briefing Materials NATO Enlargement and the Release of the Study on Enlargement", U.S. Department of State, September 28, 1995.
- 14 Paul E. Gallis, "NATO: Congress Addresses Expansion of the Alliance", Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, October 30, 1995.
- 15 Ibid, p. 2.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Ibid, p. 3.
- 18 U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "Charting a Transatlantic Agenda for the 21st Century", U.S. Department of State, June 2, 1995.
- 19 Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1995, p. 44.
- 20 Ibid, p. 45.
- 21 U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "Why NATO Should Grow", *The New York Review of Books*, August 10, 1995.
- 22 Ibid, pp. 4-5.
- 23 Paul E. Gallis, "NATO: Congress Addresses Expansion of the Alliance", CRS, October 30, 1995, p. 8.
- 24 Ibid, pp 3-5.
- 25 Ibid, p. 4.
- 26 Ibid, p. 5.
- 27 Ibid, pp. 5-6.
- 28 Senator Sam Nunn, "The Future of NATO in an Uncertain World", Senate Armed Services Committee, June 22, 1995.
- 29 Rick Maze, "Nunn Advises Caution in Proposal to Expand NATO", *Army Times*, October 23, 1995. P. 8.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Notes from discussions with former Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Elleman Jensen and Ambassadoe K. Erik Tygensen, Washington, D.C., September 13, 1995.
- 32 Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1995, p. 46.

- 33 Paul E. Gallis, "NATO", CRS, October 30, 1995.
- 34 Ibid, p. 9.
- 35 Ibid, p. 10.
- 36 ACUS Senior Fellow Notes, North Atlantic Assembly Meeting, Turin Italy, October 6-9, 1995.
- 37 NATO, "Study on NATO Enlargement", September 28, 1995.
- 38 Gebhardt Von Moltke, "NATO Moves Towards Enlargement", *NATO Overview*, January 1996.
- 39 Paul E. Gallis, CRS, p. 11.
- 40 Lieutenant General Edward L. Rowny USA (Ret.), "Change in Russia: A Personal Assessment", ACUS Bulletin, November 28, 1995.
- 41 Notes from discussions with Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Deputy Chairman, Polish Parliamentary Committee on Defense, ACUS, October 17, 1995.
- 42 Andrzej Karkoszka, "NATO Expansion - The View from Poland", 1995 NATO Symposium, Washington D.C., April 24-25, 1995.
- 43 Zhelyu Zhelev, President of the Republic of Bulgaria, "The New Foreign Policy of Bulgaria and NATO", Foreign Policy Lecture before the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria, April 17, 1995.
- 44 Mirko Cigler, "Slovenija in NATO", The Anthology "Slovenia and NATO", First Annual Session of the Assembly of the Atlantic Council of Slovenia, July 1995.
- 45 Stephen J. Blank, "Prague, NATO, and European Security", U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 17, 1996.
- 46 Notes taken from conversations with Russian Ambassador Cherkin in September 1995 and Colonel General Shetsov in May 1996.
- 47 Notes taken from conversations with Peter Bird Swiers, Director for East-West Studies Program, ACUS.
- 48 James A. Duran, "Russia and Ukraine: Political and Economic Update", Bulletin, ACUS, March 1, 1996.
- 49 Notes taken from discussions with Sergey Rogov, ACUS, October 1995.
- 50 Notes taken from conversations with Peter Swiers, ACUS, April 1996.
- 51 Sergey Rogov, "Russia and NATO's Enlargement", Center for Naval Analyses, October 1995.
- 52 Notes taken from discussions with Russian Colonel General Leontiy P. Shevtsov, Deputy for Russian Forces in IFOR, ACUS, May 1, 1996.
- 53 Jack Mendelsohn, "The CFE Treaty: In Retrospect and Under Review", *Arms Control Today*, April 1996.
- 54 W. Y. Smith, "Russia-United States Security Relationships", ACUS, June 6, 1995.
- 55 Jack Mendelsohn, "The CFE Treaty: In Retrospect and Under Review", *Arms Control Today*, April 1996.
- 56 Notes taken from conversation with the Honorable Thomas Graham, U.S. Delegation Head to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Review Conference, ACUS, May 9, 1996.
- 57 Bill Getz, "Shalikashvili warns Republicans not to undermine arms reduction", Washington Times, May 23, 1996, p. A4.
- 58 "The New European Security Architecture", USIA Office of Research and Media

Reaction, September 1995.

⁵⁹ General Andrew J. Goodpaster USA (RET), ACUS Co-Chair, "A Positive Framework for U.S. - Russian Relations: A Possibility for the Next Summit?", ACUS Bulletin, November 28, 1995.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ President Clinton, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement", The White House, February 1996.

⁶² Charles Weiss Jr., "The Marshall Plan: Lessons for U.S. Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union", Occasional Paper Series, ACUS, December 1995.

⁶³ Notes taken from speech delivered by Vice President Al Gore, to the U.S. - Russia Business Council, Four Seasons Hotel, Washington D.C., October 19, 1995.

⁶⁴ General George A. Joulwan, SACEUR, "When Ivan Meets GI Joe", Washington Post, April 28, 1996.

⁶⁵ Notes taken from discussions with Colonel General Shevtsov, ACUS, April 6, 1996.

⁶⁶ WEU Press and Information Service, "European Security: a Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries", WEU Council of Ministers, Madrid Spain, November 14, 1995.